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Introduction 
The collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s did not only end the bipolar 
Cold War era, but it also marked the restructuring of the international security scenario, especially 
in Asia. When the Soviet Union, a primary world power, was immediately replaced by a more 
unstable and vulnerable Russia, it created a window of opportunity for competition and even 
confrontation for the surrounding states, among which China was the most qualified challenger to 
Russia due to its aggregate strength and geographical proximity. Although China responded to the 
crisis with precaution, silence, and retrospection instead of making aggressive moves to expand its 
territory and influence, a delayed confrontation between the two countries has remained to be a 
possible outcome. Today, Russia and China have claimed a “strategic partnership” with shared 
political, economic and security interests; however, this relationship is an aberration of their history 
of antagonism and enmity. 1  With the absence of an immediate threat and the growth of its 
economy in the 1980s, China’s security policy has shifted from aggression that seeks to secure its 
survival, to international instability prevention that tries to minimize potential conflicts. However, 
in the past twenty years, many people have expected to see a higher level of conflict between 
Russia and China. Where do these expectations come from? What explains their low level of 
conflict across border regions and in general since the early 1990s? These are the questions that 
this paper aims to answer. 
 
                                                             
1 Bobo Lo, “The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership: Russia’s Evolving China Policy,” International Affairs 80, no. 2 (March 
2004): 295-309; Kerry R. Bolton, “Russia and China an Approaching Conflict?” The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic 
Studies 34, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 154-194. 
3 
 
Expectations of Conflict 
Following the settling down of the Soviet revulsion in the mid-1990s, the view of the new 
regional order in Asia and among post-Soviet states was not optimistic in the eyes of Russian 
scholars, politicians, and western observers. With the sudden shift of Russia’s identity from a 
world-class hegemon to a regional power living in future uncertainty, the Russians grew a high 
consciousness of threat perception along with a desire of defending their vast while underpopulated 
territory. While largely remaining reticent after the revulsion, China is Russia’s most qualified 
challenger in the East. In fact, it is now commonplace to suggest that the strategic partnership 
between Russia and China is driven largely by pragmatic considerations. As Elizabeth Wishnick 
precisely put to describe the nature of this relationship: “Russia, a declining great power, aims to 
recover its lost status, while China, a rising power, resists efforts to constrain its emerging global 
role”.2 Despite their many common interests and positions, the divergent nature of Russia and 
China’s current situation and the absence of strategic calculations put the solidity of their 
partnership into question. While various conflict scenarios are expected between the two countries, 
the puzzle is about the absence of direct confrontation, given their great power interests and their 
several border regions. This is an anomaly in comparison to their power relations in history from 
the nineteenth century to the Cold War, as well as other cases of neighboring great power politics. 
In fact, instead of going to direct confrontation or making deterring moves, Russia and China 
remain peaceful and even cooperative with very few disputes. Therefore, concerning the mismatch 
between expectations and the reality, I will first examine these expectations and their origins in the 
mid-1990s, when the Sino-Russian rapprochement then made it possible for open evaluations on 
                                                             
2 Elizabeth Wishnick, Mending Fences, The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Seattle, Wash.: 
University of Washington Press, 2001), 133. 
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the new relations between the two countries. In essence, I believe that expectations of conflict are 
mostly rooted in unilateral mistrust, fear, or discontent from Russia. Because the Chinese are taking 
more initiative and providing the driving force to this partnership, they are generally more content 
with their relationship with Russia, and are less likely to respond to Russian’s negative attitude or 
to exacerbate potential tension. In addition, following pragmatic considerations of this partnership, 
both Russian and Chinese officials have been trying to ease the existing tensions and promote an 
image of friendship. However, these expectations of conflict remain valuable in understanding the 
nature of the Russia-China partnership. 
Expectation of conflict: historical antagonism 
In general, the Russians manifest a higher level of insecurity and concern than the Chinese do, 
and most expectations of conflict look at Russia’s potential reaction to an emerging China. There 
are several case-scenarios with conflict expectations between Russia and China. The first one 
derives from historically and racially based antagonism between Russia and China, which is now 
expressed as the Russians’ mistrust to the Chinese. Also known as the “yellow peril” sentiment, it 
sometimes comes along with the prejudice against the inferiority and the dangerous nature of 
Asians.3 Since Russia identifies itself with a superior European identity, lack of cultural affinity 
or common norms in society-level contact with China creates friction between the two countries.4 
Furthermore, such prejudice is further fueled by the fear of Chinese irredentism that is discontent 
                                                             
3 Bobo Lo, “The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership: Russia’s Evolving China Policy,” International Affairs 80, no. 2 (March 
2004): 295-309; Brian Carlson, “The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership in Central Asia,” Journal of Public and 
International Affairs 18 (Spring 2007): 165-187; Viktor Larin, “Interregional Cooperation between Russia and China at the 
Beginning of the 21st Century: Experience, Problems, Prospects,” Far Eastern Affairs 36, no. 2 (2008): 1-17. 
4 Robert H. Donaldson and John A. Donaldson, “The Arms Trade in Russian-Chinese Relations: Identity, Domestic Politics, and 
Geopolitical Positioning,” International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 4 (Dec. 2003): 709-732. 
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with border demarcation, and by other fears of Chinese military modernization, Chinese economic 
development, and Chinese migration to the Russia Far East (RFE) and Eastern Siberia. 5  In 
particular, this “China threat” argument is well-developed among some Russian scholars. In a 
historical context, assertive Chinese gestures in the South China Sea (1995, 1997) and the East 
China Sea (1996) and other questions of disputed borders were perceived as evidences of a 
belligerent and expansionist China.6 According to Mikhail Titarenko, director of Russia’s key 
China think tank, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, over twenty years of alienation and enmity (from 
the early 1960s to the late 1980s) left very deep scars “in the hearts of the two countries’ people”.7 
Additionally, some Russian elites believe that an alliance with China will relegate Russia to a 
subordinate position and deprive it of its distinctiveness. 8  They fear that Russia could be 
transformed into a raw material appendage for a rising China, first as a warehouse of resources, 
and then becoming economically and politically affiliated. In short, the Russian perspective on 
China is affected by a complex amalgamation of geopolitical, economic, historical, and cultural 
factors that result in a profound ambivalence toward their rapidly growing neighbor.9 
Although there is no clear sign that such anti-Chinese sentiment has affected the decision-
making of Moscow, its existence in the federal government can still be discerned. For example, 
                                                             
5 Bobo Lo, “The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership: Russia’s Evolving China Policy,” International Affairs 80, no. 2 (March 
2004): 295-309. 
6 For a comprehensive list of Russian opinions, see Anastasia Solomentseva, “The ‘Rise’ of China in the Eyes of Russia: A Source 
of Threats or New Opportunities?” The Quarterly Journal 14, no. 1 (2014): 3-40; William A. Callahan, “How to Understand China: 
The Dangers and Opportunities of Being a Rising Power,” Review of International Studies 31, no. 4 (October, 2005): 701-714. 
7 Mikhail Titarenko, “The Role and Importance of Russian-Chinese Relations in the Context of the Basic Features of the Current 
International Environment,” Far Eastern Affairs 38, no. 1 (2010): 1–14. 
8 Alexander Lukin, “The Russian Approach to China under Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin,” in Russian Strategic Thought toward 
Asia, ed. Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph P. Ferguson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 143; Sergey Karaganov, 
“Russia’s Asian Strategy,” Russia in Global Affairs, July 2, 2011, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Russias-Asian-Strategy-15254.  
9 Andrew Kuchins, “Russian Perspectives on China: Strategic Ambivalence,” in The Future of China-Russia Relations, ed. J. 
Bellacqua (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 33. 
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Sergey Karaganov, Russian political scientist who heads the Council for Foreign and Defense 
Policy and the former Presidential Advisor to both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, is a 
representative figure of this view. He once wrote: “To the Russian public mind and most of the 
elite, China is still [more of] a threat than an opportunity. It is believed that China may directly 
threaten Russia’s sovereignty”.10 Similarly, the former vice-chairman of the Federal Council, 
Vasily Likhachev, shared this view that China poses a geopolitical threat to Russia, and the former 
Russian Defense Minister Igor Radionov once listed China among the main potential enemies of 
Russia.11 Even President Vladimir Putin (then Prime Minister), in his speech addressing the issue 
of Russia’s defense, brought up the mistrust of China: “To be honest, the three top-tier centres of 
power – the United States, Europe, and China – are not exactly our friends…with respect to our 
relations with China…we should proceed with caution here. I’m referring to the protection of our 
national interests”.12 Therefore, this threat perception occasionally expressed by the state officials 
indicates a long-standing Russian mistrust of China. Although this mistrust has not yet dominated 
actual policies, it has the potential to gain a larger voice once it is triggered by disputes or divergent 
interests in the future. Therefore, concerned with the growing Chinese power and imbalance of 
economic development, the Russians have more reasons to be threatened by China; and Russia’s 
mistrust toward China is more likely to correspond to this expected version of conflict. 
                                                             
10 Sergey Karaganov, “Russia’s Asian Strategy,” Russia in Global Affairs, July 2, 2011, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Russias-
Asian-Strategy-15254. 
11 Alexander Lukin, “Russian Perceptions of the China Threat,” in The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, ed. Herbert 
Yee and Ian Storey (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 92-94. 
12 “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin meets with experts in Sarov to discuss global threats to national security, strengthening 
Russia’s defences and enhancing the combat readiness of its armed forces”, Archive of the Official Site of the 2008-2012 Prime 
Minister of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, February 24, 2012, http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18248/.  
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On the other hand, China’s attitude towards Russia has been quite ambivalent, but the public 
opinion is moving toward the positive side.13 In history, due to the confrontation with Imperial 
Russia in Qing (Dynasty) China, the humiliation (perceived by the Chinese) of the Sino-Soviet 
Treaty,14 and the Sino-Russian military clash over Zhenbao (Damansky) Island (a small island 
located on the Ussuri River on the border) in the 1960s, a certain amount of Chinese still see Russia 
with suspicion. The combination of historical fear and political-cultural stereotyping kept Chinese 
strategic planners vigilant to signs of Russian aggression.15 During the Cold War, Mao regarded 
the Soviet Union as equally interested in blocking China’s rise as the U.S. was. Later on, Tsarist 
imperialist aggression was often recalled during the time of the Sino-Soviet split as another sign 
of mistrust. Even in the 1980s with China’s open reforms, Beijing still viewed Moscow as an 
offensive threat possible of ending up with a preemptive war. 16  However, Gorbachev’s 
normalization policy transformed Russia’s relations with China after he made concessions and 
announced substantial troop cuts in Mongolia and the Far East. 17  Subsequently, Beijing’s 
determination to take a positive approach to the newly established Russia was reflected by an 
immediate visit of a high-level Chinese delegation to Moscow two days after the Soviet Union 
ceased to exist.18 Therefore, three decades after the most recent dispute, each of these decades saw 
barriers that limited rapid development in bilateral ties, but nevertheless some success in removing 
                                                             
13 According to the BBC poll conducted by GlobeScan and PIPA at 2006, the Chinese public's impression of Russia is 56% 
positive. This result corresponds to the number provided by the Pew Research Center, according to which a Chinese favorable 
view of Russia has been around 50% from 2007 to 2013, and reaches its peak of 66% at 2014. 
14 Here it refers to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, a treaty of alliance signed by the PRC 
and Soviet Union on February 14, 1950. The new Chinese regime was eager to be recognized by the international community 
(mostly the communist community) at the time, and this treaty recognized Soviet Union’s benefits in the Far East. 
15 Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 335. 
16 Gilbert Rozman, Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 49, 133-134. 
17 Paul Marantz, “Moscow and East Asia: New Realities and New Policies,” in East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. 
Sheldon W. Simon (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 29. 
18 Li Jingjie, “From Good Neighbors to Strategic Partners,” in Rapprochement or Rivalry? : Russia-China Relations in a Changing 
Asia, ed. Sherman W. Garnett (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), 73. 
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existing serious impediments.19 With more frequent high-level exchanges and deepening Sino-
Russian dialogue, threat perception and mistrust were greatly reduced on the Chinese side, and 
elite perceptions of their need for each other steadily strengthened.20  
Despite some general discussions on the “lack of mutual trust” between Russia and China in 
Chinese literature, skeptical views towards the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership are not 
explicitly revealed by officials in both countries due to pragmatic considerations and the policy 
goal of maintaining stability. Therefore, even the grievances and biases left by history still have an 
adverse psychological effect on efforts to bring the two countries closer, Chinese mistrust towards 
Russia remains in a small voice and is not likely to be the main destabilizing factor to trigger 
another Sino-Russian confrontation. Although the Chinese do recognize the lack of mutual trust 
between the two countries and some even remain vigilant toward Russia, they do not have further 
threat perceptions or expectations of conflict, given China’s growing economic power and political 
influence. In short, this expectation of Russian-Chinese conflict based on fear and mistrust tends 
to be a unilateral perception of the Russian side.  
Expectation of conflict: Chinese expansion into the RFE 
Another popular Russian-Chinese conflict scenario is based on the potential Chinese 
expansion into Russian territory; this version is mainly voiced by a few western scholars and by 
the Russian public in the regions that border China.21 While this prediction on the potential 
Chinese expansion takes various forms that range from food-crisis to growing economic needs, 
                                                             
19 Gilbert Rozman, “The Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership. How Close? Where to?” in The Future of China-Russia Relations, ed. 
J. Bellacqua (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 14. 
20 Gilbert, Rozman, “Sino-Russian Relations: Mutual Assessments and Predictions,” in Rapprochement or Rivalry? Russia-China 
Relations in a Changing Asia, ed. Sherman W. Garnett (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), 
154. 
21 Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 
48, 65. 
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demographic expansion and illegal immigration are the most plausible ones.22 In fact, flourishing 
cross-border trade leads to a growing Chinese presence in the border areas, especially in the Russia 
Far East (RFE); and this change of demography has created negative feelings in the local public. 
Although the number of Chinese population in the RFE is not known with any precision, local 
government politicians and analysts tend to use an over-estimated number. In 1993, different 
estimates of Chinese population in the RFE ranged from 200,000 to 2 million, and the latter 
accounted for nearly one-third of the local population, which was an extremely exaggerated and 
highly speculative figure.23 In fact, according to a more accurate calculation, the number of 
permanent Chinese residents in the RFE was quite small, with no more than 20,000 people, and 
the real number of Chinese immigrants should not exceed 50,000-80,000 people between 1992 
and 1993.24 Moreover, the shrink of local population further contributed to a false perception of 
the size of Chinese population in the region. Due to the lack of Moscow’s subsidies and the 
subsequent deterioration of living conditions, the Russian population in the RFE has been in rapid 
decline since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Estimated 9000,000 people fled the region in the 
                                                             
22 The food-crisis version of Chinese expansion is mainly represented by Harrison Salisbury, who contends that a food-
population crisis, which is periodically throughout China’s history, would result in China’s seeking living space and resources in 
Russia. This point is further supported by a few American scholars, among whom Lester Brown predicts that a food shortage 
would motivate Beijing’s aggressive policy. However, these arguments are mostly based on the assumption of a huge Chinese 
domestic disturbance, which is not discussed and concerned by the mainstream literature. For more information, see Harrison 
E. Salisbury, The Coming War between Russia and China (London: Pan Books, 1969) and Lester R. Brown, Who Will Feed China? : 
Wake-Up Call for a Small Planet (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995). For a full list of “China Threat Theories”, see Yong 
Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
106-107. 
23 Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 
59-60; Pavel A. Minakir, “Chinese Immigration in the Russian Far East: Regional, National, and International Dimensions,” in 
Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Migration, ed. Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin 
(Washington D.C.: RAND Corporation, 1996), 94. The book is accessible online at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2007/CF130.pdf.  
24 According to reliable data from the Institute of Economic Research in Khabarovsk, even in 1992–93, the peak period of Sino-
Russian border trade, 50,000-80,000 Chinese worked in the Russian Far East, which include 10,000-15,000 contract workers and 
10,000- 12,000 students, and 5,000-6,000 illegal immigrants. According to estimates from a leading Russian specialist on 
Chinese migration, as of 2000 there were 250,000-450,000 Chinese in Russia, including approximately 20,000-25,000 in Moscow 
and a maximum of 20,000 in each of two of the border regions in the RFE. For more information, see works of Vilya G. Gelbras, 
and Elizabeth Wishnick, “The Securitization of Chinese Migration to the Russian Far East: Rhetoric and Reality”, Paper presented 
at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar 05, 2005. 
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1990s, and throughout 1991-2011, 11.5 % of its population migrated to more prosperous areas of 
Russia.25  
However, the reality does not ease the anxiety of a Russian-perceived Chinese demographic 
expansion as the result of over-estimated numbers. Local newspapers and academic articles argued 
that China was pursuing a deliberate policy of solving its unemployment and overpopulation at the 
expense of Russia. This belief of the Chinese “moving to the North” was well accepted among the 
border regions,26 and an official document issued by the Primorskii Krai administration in 1997 
perceived China as one of the most active expansionists into the RFE.27 Following the large 
number of Chinese immigrants, a pessimistic scenario pictures growing Chinese influence over 
the region’s economy and policies, increasing Chinese ownership of privatized properties, regional 
political instability and weakening control of Russian central government, as well as increasing 
ethnic and cultural tensions between the Russians and the Chinese.28 Furthermore, as the Chinese 
population expands and the Russian population declines, this sense of regional vulnerability leads 
to the fear of “Sinofication” and massive anti-Chinese propaganda. During the 1990s, regional 
leaders such as Primorye governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko and Khabarovsk governor Victor Ishaev 
exploited popular sentiments by selling the Chinese threat of “illegal migration” and “creeping 
                                                             
25 Jeanne L. Wilson, Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese Relations in the Post- Soviet Era (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 197-122; 
Zhanna Zaionchkovskaya, Nikita Mkrtchian, and Elena Tyuryukanova, “Russia’s Immigration Challenges,” in Russia and East Asia: 
Informal and Gradual Integration, ed. Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 232. 
26 Alexander Lukin, “Russian Perceptions of the China Threat,” in The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, ed. Herbert 
Yee and Ian Storey (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 92-94. 
27 “Proposals of the Administration of the Maritime Territory on Completing the Demarcation of the Russian-Chinese Border in 
Ussuri and Khasan Districts,” in The Russian Maritime Region on the Threshold of the Third Millennium, cited in Alexander Lukin, 
“Russian Perceptions of the China Threat,” in The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, ed. Herbert Yee and Ian Storey 
(New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 94. 
28 Alexei D. Voskressenski, “Russia’s Evolving Grand Strategy toward China,” in Rapprochement or Rivalry? : Russia-China 
Relations in a Changing Asia, ed. Sherman W. Garnett (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), 
135; Jeanne L. Wilson, Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese Relations in the Post- Soviet Era (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 127. 
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expansion”. These political expediencies do not distinguish well between the threat of Chinese 
population and the China threat, but only associate them with hostile intent of Beijing.29  
Another version of the Chinese expansion that focuses on material requests is expressed more 
frequently in public opinion. An article in the Moscow Times argued that, although the border issue 
between Russia and China was settled in 1996, the scenario of a more aggressive China is still 
possible. Spurred by economic needs, security concerns, and its own great-power ambitions, China 
would “no doubt take a hardline against its weakened neighbor to the North”.30 With substantial 
Chinese settlers yearning toward the RFE, China might recall its history and raise the question of 
its return to the region. In addition, another interview with a number of Russian experts on the 
issue of the Sino-Russian border agreement proved the concern that China might put forward new 
territorial claims and that such an agreement might establish a precedent for Japan. In particular, 
these Russian experts feared that a small territorial compromise made by Moscow may trigger 
something bigger, such as the demand for the entire Khabarovsk territory. 31  Therefore, the 
prediction of China expansionist threat has a good number of audience especially among the local 
population in the RFE. 
The concern of a Chinese population expansion is also discussed in Moscow and results in 
political reverberations at the federal level. Government officials in the Federal Border Service, 
the Federal Migration Service, the Ministry of Interior, and the procuratorial offices have all 
expressed an “institutional hostility” toward the Chinese presence in the RFE.32 For example, 
                                                             
29 Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 
65. 
30 Yevgeny Bazhanov, “Reading China's Future,” The Moscow Times, January 15, 1995, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/1995/6/article/reading-chinas-future/338272.html.  
31 BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring. The territorial compromise here 
refers to a treaty on border demarcation signed in 1991, according to which Russia and China exchanged several areas of land 
but Russia gave up slightly more than China. 
32 Jeanne L. Wilson, Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese Relations in the Post- Soviet Era (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 122-124. 
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Alexander Khramchikhin, Deputy Director of the Analytical Department of the Institute of 
Political and Military Analysis, believed that China would unavoidably expand at the expense of 
occupying Siberia and the Far East. “China is objectively a non-viable in its current borders. China 
must be a lot more if it does not want to be much less. It cannot survive without expansion abroad 
to capture the resources and territories, this is a reality.” He argued that although a peaceful form 
of expansion (economical and demographical) was preferred, the military one remained to be a 
possible option.33 Similarly, the former acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar openly subscribed to 
the theory of China’s “population threat,” and argued that the stark contrast of population density 
across the Sino-Russian border was the real reason for this confrontation. 34  Later in 2000, 
President Vladimir Putin addressed the concern in his lecture: “if we do not take concrete steps in 
the immediate future, then in a few decades even the native Russian population of the Far East will 
be speaking Japanese, Chinese, and Korean”.35 In short, the Russians in the RFE and Siberia 
believe that no matter how sweet the political relationship is, a sharp asymmetry of population and 
vital resources across the border of Russia and China creates a natural vacuum that will drive the 
Chinese to expand.36  
In response to these predictions, China issued its first rebuttal in 1995, equating them with the 
Cold War mentality, ill will, and bias against China. Since then, the government as well as official 
media have tried to assure other countries of China’s peaceful and cooperative intent.37 The 
                                                             
33 Alexander Khramchikhin, “'It Is Not a Question Whether China Will Attack Russia but Is When It Is Going to happen’, the 
Russians Say,” Kavkaz Center, March 15, 2010, http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2010/03/15/11632.shtml.  
34 Alexander Lukin, “Russian Perceptions of the China Threat,” in The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, ed. Herbert 
Yee and Ian Storey (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 99. 
35 Alexander Lukin, “Russian - Chinese Relations,” Institute for International Political Studies, no. 167 (April 2013). 
36 Kerry R. Bolton, “Russia and China an Approaching Conflict?” The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies 34, no. 2 
(Summer 2009): 154-194; Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington D.C: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2008), 179. 
37 Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 114. 
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Chinese have been well aware of the sensitiveness of this fear of demographic expansion, and they 
have sought with some success to nullify its impact on their relations.38 Despite these efforts, 
China’s potential threat has already been felt economically and demographically in the RFE while 
the RFE is becoming increasingly reliant on the Chinese investment. Although the current Chinese 
leadership does not have territorial assertions toward Russia, a dominant view in the Chinese 
society is that Russia gained some territories in the Far East from China through “unequal” treaties, 
and this perception may further exacerbate the voice for “living space”.39 Therefore, the problem 
of the RFE continues to be a potential trigger for a Sino-Russian confrontation.  
Expectation of conflict: a new Great Game 
The last expectation of conflict derives from the prospect of Russian-Chinese competition in 
Central Asia, and this is a view less of the public than of Moscow. Despite the shared interests of 
Russia and China in Central Asia, their policies in this region still conflict frequently. First, when 
Moscow is engaging in an activist project of reestablishing itself in a traditional sphere of influence, 
any involvement of outside power may be deemed a threat to its interests, even if it targets only 
on economic interests. This grand Russian ambition was revealed in an article published by 
President Putin (then Prime Minister) to inaugurate Eurasian integration projects; he stated that 
“by building the Customs Union and Common Economic Space, we are laying the foundation for 
a prospective Eurasian economic union...We plan to go beyond that, and set ourselves an ambitious 
goal of reaching a higher level of integration – a Eurasian Union”.40 Thus, given Russia’s frequent 
                                                             
38 Gilbert Rozman, “Turning Fortresses into Free Trade Zones,” in Rapprochement or Rivalry? : Russia-China Relations in a 
Changing Asia, ed. Sherman W. Garnett (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), 177-202; 
Gilbert Rozman, “Northeast China: Waiting for Regionalism,” Problems of Post-Communism 45, no.4 (July-August 1998): 3-13. 
39 Alexander Lukin, “The Russian Approach to China under Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin,” in Russian Strategic Thought toward 
Asia, ed. Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph P. Ferguson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 153. 
40 “Article by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin ‘A new integration project for Eurasia: The future in the making’,” Permanent 
Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, October 3, 2011, http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/article-
prime-minister-vladimir-putin-new-integration-project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3-.  
14 
 
claim in the post-Soviet space for vital interests and national security, little space is left for a more 
active Chinese presence in the region. Second, if the new East-West transport route in the possible 
future of Central Asia bypass Russia, it may restrict the RFE development and hurt its economy. 
Russia thus fears that the fast development and exploitation of Central Asia would potentially 
damage its territorial integrity.41 Last, the energy reserve in Central Asia further complicates the 
issue. Russian officials have actively opposed Chinese efforts to acquire majority ownership of 
Central Asian energy assets, since Russia prefers to have resources under Russian domination 
through its powerful state-run energy companies or Central Asia’s pliant national governments.42 
This arrangement will help Russia to secure its sphere of influence and maintain relative monopoly 
in the energy market. However, in conflict with Russia’s insistence on maintaining control, China 
desires to exert direct supervision over regional energy assets.  
Although China remains deferential to Russia by not challenging Russia’s primary role in the 
region, the shadow of Chinese existence is growing and being felt by the Russians due to the 
dynamism and the strength of the Chinese economy. Therefore, there is an uneasiness in Russia 
about the Chinese influence in the region.43 In short, the two countries are direct competitors in 
Central Asia, since Russia wants to return to the previous domination while China wants to be 
more active and acquire more interests (especially economic interests) in the region. Hence, some 
western scholars believe that when China is no longer able to achieve its objectives by diplomatic 
and subtle means, it is likely to drop its label of “good-neighbor” and move to aggression.44 
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Therefore, this scenario has the potential to become direct confrontation between the two countries.  
 
Regional Explanation vs. Systemic Explanation 
Different theoretical frameworks have been provided by existing literature to explain this 
anomaly of Russia-China peace and their “strategic partnership” in the twenty-first century. Given 
Russia and China’s many border regions and overlapped interests abroad, the nonexistence of 
confrontation between the two regional powers, if not global, drives scholars to explore this new 
great power relationship when the traditional measurements of power transition and balance of 
power within clearly defined boundaries have been challenged by globalization and technological 
advancement. In general, there are two main explanations. The first one argues that under existing 
regional systems, Russia and China are more cooperative, either because of their convergent 
mutual interests in strategic regions or because potential conflictual issues have not yet been 
revealed. On the other hand, the systemic explanation puts the discussion under the global context. 
It argues that the whole idea of considering these regional issues separately has been overwhelmed 
by the global incentive to avoid conflict and seek cooperation due to Russia and China’s shared 
threat perception to the third transregional party, notably the U.S.  
According to the regional explanation, Russia and China’s behaviors are mainly guided by the 
consideration of a regional system in which they are situated in. Because of the risk of the 
regionalisation of conflict, which refers to both the outward spillover of a local conflict into 
neighboring countries, and the inward impact on the region in the form of diplomatic interference 
and conflict resolution carried out by some kind of regional body, states and actors in a particular 
geographical area may direct their interaction to maintaining a peaceful, if not cooperative, security 
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community.45 In particular, Russia and China have security interdependence, or a regional security 
complex, that either of their security cannot be considered apart from one another. The foundation 
of the Sino-Russian partnership lies in the strategic convergence between the two countries and 
many mutually beneficial ties.46 This relationship reflects a converging understanding on the 
importance of regional stability facing notable threats in the region, and of domestic challenges to 
Russia and China’s economic development. Although Sino-Russian relations in their early years 
were motivated by a strategic rationale with an important conservative anchor against Western 
global politics, a congruence of Sino-Russian interests marked the later structural stage of the Sino-
Russian relationship; focusing on a pragmatic and non-confrontational aspect, closer cooperation 
in all fields as well as a certain complementarity in their economic structures conceptualize the 
Sino-Russian partnership in full detail.47 Furthermore, strategic and political concerns bring the 
two countries together, creating the foundations for an incipient alliance and fertile ground for new 
triangular maneuvering with the U.S.48 Therefore, Russia and China remain together because their 
respective interests across many border regions prevent them from confronting each other. 
On the other hand, to see this Sino-Russian partnership in the global context, the idea of a 
regional system no longer matters. According to this explanation, Russia and China’s behaviors 
are greatly affected by their respective global contest with the U.S., since they both perceive the 
U.S. as their primary concern.49 This global balance of power conforms to structural realism, 
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which predicts that Russia and China together seek to challenge the unipolar order by promoting 
multipolarity.50 The foundation of this partnership is a shared worldview; bilateral relations are 
energized more by the two countries’ wariness of the emerging global environment than by their 
approval of it or by interest concerns about cooperation or conflict.51 Despite being a “second-tier” 
grouping that cannot offer a concrete alternate paradigm to the present international system, this 
partnership can serve to exert pressure against the West in order to pursue their respective 
interests.52 Moreover, some believe that the two countries are pursuing an alternative to the 
prevailing Western model; instead of relying on democracy or communist ideology to create 
loyalty to the political system, this model stresses a combination of economic growth and 
nationalism. 53  Despite systemic differences of the two regimes and their different policy 
consistency, Russia and China’s compatible need for independent political positions both 
domestically and internationally lies in the innermost assumption of contemporary Russo-Chinese 
bilateralism.54 Furthermore, some argue that the prospect for a Sino-Russian strategic partnership 
is contingent upon each’s relations with the United States; the more the U.S. acts unilaterally, the 
more likely Russia and China will be drawn together to check this unipolar trend.55 Therefore, 
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their partnership is an expedient move that depends on the existence and the intensity of their 
common threat perception; in other words, whether or not Russia and China have any cooperative 
interests in strategic regions will have little weight according to this explanation.  
 
Methods 
The method section is arranged as followed. The identification of Russia and China’s interests 
at a global and at a regional level will be the first step. After comparing the results to this finding, 
a two-level filter is applied to narrow down the case scenarios to those of critical importance to the 
two countries and hence are most constructive to the maintaining of Russia-China relations. 
Specifically with the second level filter, two independent variables are derived respectively from 
the two theories suggested above. After the coding rules are explained and justified in each cases, 
we select two pairs of case studies that will shed insight into our understanding to Russia-China 
relations at large. 
Furthermore, evidences are collected mainly in the time period of late 1990s and the 2000s. 
In addition to historical events and pure facts, I first examine public discourse made by political 
leaders and elites, which are of great value in reflecting the mentality and the beliefs of decision-
makers in a country. Second, I look at private and public conversations of experts and opinion 
articles; these sources provide reliable information and convincing analysis, as well as well-
articulated perspectives. Finally, commentaries and news articles are also examined to reflect 
public opinion. In particular, since official statements usually can be grandiose while lack in 
substance, I evaluate their specific word choice and expression as the indicators for countries’ 
interest or perception. 
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Russia and China’s Interests Abroad 
Russia and China have a broad spectrum of interests abroad, and these interests have presented 
the two countries with countless opportunities of cooperation as well as some potential conflicts. 
Their first concern exists in the global system vis-à-vis the U.S. hegemony. Russia’s approach to 
build strategic partnership with other powers including China allows it to have more room for 
maneuver on a global scale and ensures its continuing high-profile participation in the international 
mainstream.56 Therefore, Moscow shares many security interests and threat perceptions with 
Beijing. Both Russia and China pursue a counterbalancing role centered on the system of 
international values and institutions, which fosters international multipolarity and emphasizes the 
primacy of the United Nations in the global decision-making.57 In their bilateral relations, Russia 
and China promote the five principles of peaceful coexistence: mutual respect for territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, 
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.58  
Russian and Chinese convergence of interests on these international issues was affirmed in 
April 1997 when they signed the Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and 
the Formation of a New World Order. Unlike other statements, this one exclusively dealt with 
international issues and stressed the critical role of the Security Council of the U.N. in maintaining 
peace and global security.59 One prominent scholar in the field pointed out that the two sides’ aim 
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is “nothing less than a counterthrust against a new world order led by the United States”.60 By the 
end of the 1990s, two issues could be identified in their joint opposition to the U.S. foreign policy 
agenda: (1) the role of NATO as an international organization, especially in terms of its expansion; 
and (2) U.S. efforts to develop missile defense systems and to modify the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty.61 In late 1998 and 1999, Russia and China condemned U.S. displays of 
power, especially in 1999 war in Yugoslavia. Despite that Russia and China’s denial that their 
partnership is directed against any specific country, they want to build as least a loose coalition of 
rival powers against the West, which can prevent them from being isolated and labeled as rogue 
states individually. 62  Later on, George W. Bush’s global war on terrorism led to military 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which resulted in Moscow and Beijing coming together in a 
common purpose of “countering the geopolitical presence of the hegemon in their ‘sphere of vital 
interests’”.63 Therefore, to a large extent, balancing the U.S. hegemony is one important factor 
that shapes Russian and Chinese foreign policy. 
Besides their traditional balance of power against the U.S. hegemony, Russia and China are 
also driven together by other converging interests on the regional scale. As one scholar precisely 
puts, Sino-Russian strategic relations are more opportunistic than strategic when they work in 
concert on a range of international issues.64 Among their many shared interests, security interests 
and energy-economic interests are the two main categories. 
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Security Interests 
Separatist groups consisting of nationalists and religious extremists in Central Asia fight open 
conflict with local governments and feed terrorist activities in Russia and China. Both countries 
have seen separatism as a great concern that threatens their national integrity and sovereignty. 
Notably, the end of 2003 witnessed the beginning of a clear Russian security involvement in 
Central Asia, which was reflected in substantial political-military cooperation and joint plans 
responding to criminality and security threats.65 Furthermore, the Concept of the Foreign Policy 
of the Russian Federation of 2013 identified its national interests in security priorities including 
the neutralization of security threats and the prevention of destabilization of the situation in Central 
Asia.66 Similarly, Beijing identified the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, 
mostly under the concern that Islamic fundamentalism might threaten the Chinese domestic region 
Xinjiang. In addition to this political instability, drugs and criminal activities may also flourish, 
flow across the borders, and become a threat.67 These threats were the initial reason that drove the 
formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and created a different base of security 
cooperation other than that against the U.S. hegemony.68 In sum, Russia and China have made 
efforts with the potential of creating an authentic counterterrorism capability, an alternate power 
pole in a multilateral power.69  
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Meanwhile, concerned with the Korean nuclear crisis and other unpredictable factors of North 
Korea, Russia and China find their national interests in the preservation of the status quo on the 
peninsula. Under Putin’s presidency, he revived the effort to maneuver Russia as a mediator 
between the North and the international community, and this was the objective of his diplomacy 
in cultivating Kim Jong-Il over 2000-2002.70 Similarly, China’s national interests mostly conform 
to those of Russia. They both oppose North Korea’s nuclear project while resisting international 
intervention that may create chaos on the peninsula. The unification of Korea by the means of the 
North being absorbed by the South would not be favored by either Russian or Chinese national 
interests, since a powerful pro-American state would lead to more American forces in the region. 
However, despite their short-term common objective of conflict prevention, Russia and China’s 
long-term strategies over the peninsula differ somewhat: Russia does not share China’s vital 
concern over the survival of the North regime; instead, Russia’s goal is to preserve their regional 
influence on diplomatic relations and crisis resolution, and to seek balanced relations with the two 
Koreas. However, China looks on the Korean Peninsula as its own sphere of influence and on 
North Korea as its protégé, and this belief limits China’s willingness to accommodate to Russian 
concerns when they are not identical to that of China.71  
In addition to Russia and China’s similar position on the war against terror, other issues 
include the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international conflict management, 
the support of secular regimes, and economic and social development for the states in Central 
Asia. 72  Furthermore, Russia and China see each other as a guarantor of their respective 
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independent foreign policies and of their position as an independent power center.73 Both of them 
value the expression of support for the principle of non-interference regarding human rights, 
territorial claims, and notably, direct security concerns. In particular, Beijing has publicly backed 
Moscow over the issue of the Chechen conflict, and Russia has also given its support to Beijing’s 
suppressive efforts in Xinjiang and Tibet, as well as “One China” policy towards Taiwan.74  
Energy-economic Interests 
Energy and economic interests are another pillar that greatly affects Russia and China’s 
relationship. On one hand, Russia’s core national interests in Central Asia are manifested mainly 
as energy and economic interests, with security interests being the complimentary goal to ensure 
the prior two interests.75 Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov once stated that “Russian foreign policy 
today is such that for the first time in its history, Russia is beginning to protect its national interest 
by using its competitive advantages,” which referred mainly to energy geopolitics.76 Therefore, 
viewing Central Asia as its sphere of influence, Moscow has insisted on its priority rights of 
developing resources in Central Asia due to its historical involvement and infrastructure 
investment.77 As energy becomes a very important resource and leverage today, being able to 
control energy reserves in Central Asia energy sector is important to revitalize Russian economy 
through profitable energy resale in the lucrative European market.  
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On the other hand, China’s energy and economic interests in Central Asia are growing 
significantly with its increasing reliance on energy imports to fuel its economic growth. Beijing’s 
commitment to multibillion dollar investment in Russia and Kazakhstan demonstrated its resolve 
to make Central Asia part of its long-term energy strategy. In 1995, China imported roughly 
400,000 barrels of oil a day, and this figure turned out to be 6.2 millions of barrels in 2013.78 The 
Chinese look at Central Asia as an alternative source of energy to the Middle East, with the 
objective to rely less on Gulf oil and to buy more gas.79 However, such a large demand and 
China’s ability to plan, fund and execute deals have raised the bar in the Central Asian energy 
game. By enhancing the Central Asian states’ bargaining power in negotiations with Russia and 
granting them more economic autonomy, Beijing’s expanding economic links in the region 
potentially undermine Russia’s political and economic influence over its neighbors.80 Therefore, 
this may be seen as a conflict of interest between Russia and China.  
In short, Russia and China’s interests that could cause cooperation or conflict in a given region 
can be categorized into three kinds. At the global level, they concern their counterbalance with the 
U.S. hegemony, while at the regional level, their concerns and interests are associated with third 
party threats and energy and economic interaction.  
The First Level Filter: Regions of Interest 
Looking at Russian and Chinese foreign policies, we identify several regions of their 
substantial involvement. These regions are the Russia Far East (RFE), Northeast Asia (Korean 
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Peninsula and Japan), Southeast Asia (South China Sea and ASEAN), South Asia (above all, India), 
Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Middle East, and Africa. Since it is unlikely that these regions all 
have the same weight to Russia-China relations, the first step involves further narrowing down the 
list to critical regions. To understand different dynamics of Russia-China interaction and behaviors 
across regions, I use a two-level filter to select useful cases for further study. The first level filter 
is geographic proximity, and the second level filter is a region-by-region comparative selection.  
 
Table 1: 
Region/Country Russian Interest Russian Power 
Projection 
Chinese Interest Chinese Power 
Projection 
RFE Y Y Y Y 
Northeast Asia Y Y Y Y 
Southeast Asia N N Y Y 
South Asia Y Y Y N 
Central Asia Y Y Y Y 
Eastern Europe Y Y N N 
Middle East Y N Y N 
Africa N N Y N 
 
An important condition for the existence of national interests is geographic proximity, which 
should serve as the primary criteria to target a region with strategic potential. Although Russia and 
China have interests across the world, geographic proximity of a region to both Russian and 
Chinese homeland is the premise to involve their core national interests at the same time. In other 
words, only when a region is sufficiently close to Russia and China’s own territory, will the 
situation there have a direct impact to them, and would they care much about this region at the cost 
of affecting their grand relations with each other. Furthermore, significant interests are only made 
possible with countries’ capability of power projection. For this reason, geographic proximity 
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attaches great importance to the discussion. Because both Russia and China do not have overseas 
military bases across the world,81 nor sizeable navy fleets with aircraft carriers that are powerful 
enough to project their power over long distance, it is unlikely that they will engage in direct 
confrontation with each other across the world. And even if they do in remote regions, they are not 
likely to escalate their level of engagement due to a high operational cost. 
To begin with, for the reason of geographic proximity to both countries, Eastern Europe and 
Africa should be excluded. Russia has a great threat perception to the issues of NATO expansion 
and EU enlargement; it is eager to maintain its natural sphere of influence in the former Soviet 
states, or at least to preserve a buffer zone with NATO and EU by using both geopolitical and 
economic methods.82 However, China has little interests there due to the region’s long distance to 
China’s mainland; the Chinese see Eastern Europe as a gateway to the greater European market, 
while only focusing their interests there on trade and investment. Similarly, when China is 
promoting investments and building infrastructures in Africa, Russia does not have a similar 
agenda. Thus, due to China’s lack of attention to Eastern Europe and Russia’s indifference to 
Africa, the prospect of a Russian-Chinese conflict over Eastern Europe or Africa is very dim. 
Furthermore, the Middle East should be excluded. The lack of geographic proximity greatly 
limits Russian and Chinese involvement and interaction in the Middle East; they do not find 
incentive to deal with the anarchy or to confront the U.S. existence there in the long run, nor to 
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compete against each other. Because of its geographic distance to Chinese territory, the Middle 
East has never been a top security concern for China. Although China’s growing need for oil and 
other resources following its economic development led to an upswing of Chinese attention to the 
region, China is reluctant to take strong positions against the U.S. and its allies in dealing with 
Iran, Iraq, and other issues of controversy.83 With often conflictual imperatives, Chinese policies 
in the region are well balanced to prevent damages on any party’s interests, which makes their 
actions somewhat ambivalent and muddled.84 On the other hand, Russia has significant interests 
in the Middle East since it re-established political ties with its former Soviet clients, such as Syria. 
An approachable geographic proximity also keeps the region open to Russia.85 With Russian 
Muslims accounting for one-seventh of the country’s population, Russia cannot help caring about 
the origins of Muslim extremism and terrorism in the Middle East. In particular, two Chechen 
campaigns made the Russian leaders realize the security threats coming from the South, and 
concerns on nuclear proliferation and oil and gas market price further attracted Russia’s attention 
to the region.86 However, after the Cold War, Russia has not developed a coherent foreign policy 
towards the Middle East, and Putin’s efforts to engage the Middle East are not productive. Some 
scholars argue that Russia’s ability to veto UN resolutions does not grant it real influence in the 
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Middle East, and its real power projection capability remains limited.87 Therefore, the Middle East 
is not a point of contention for either China or Russia and thus is not taken into our consideration. 
Similarly, Southeast Asia should be excluded as well. Since the closure of Russia’s naval asset 
in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam in the early 1990s, Russia’s interests in the region have been primarily 
about arm sales, along with a reemerging interest in energy sales. 88  However, besides its 
accordance with Russia’s vision of multipolarity and economic development (arms and energy), 
Southeast Asia attaches no concrete nor unique importance to Russian national interests; instead, 
Russia’s attention in Southeast Asia is more a matter of prestige for restoring Russia’s greatness 
and relevance to world affairs. In fact, Russia did not formulate the “Concept for Russia’s 
Participation in APEC” until two years after its accession to the organization, and this ill-
preparation indicated that this move was essentially aiming for prestige rather than based on 
concrete interests.89 Therefore, the role of Southeast Asia is not unique in itself, and it is unlikely 
that Russia’s foreign relations would be affected and shaped by this region. At last, Russia no 
longer has any significant power projection capability in the region after the old Soviet security 
alliances ceased to exist. The internal problems of Russian military and economy limit Russia’s 
role to a regional land power, and Russian influence on the Southeast Asian economic order is also 
constrained by weak infrastructure and past Soviet neglect.90 Despite that Russia stresses the 
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importance of the Asia-Pacific region, it has mainly placed itself in the position of major arms 
supplier in the region, failing to offer a supporting basis for any further ambition. 91  Thus, 
Southeast Asia is not taken into our consideration either. 
In short, reviewing Table 1 presented above, there are four regions with less than one “N” 
mark, and these four regions left for our discussion are Central Asia, the Russian Far East (RFE), 
Northeast Asia, and South Asia. 
The Second Level Filter: Coding Rules 
After the first level selection, the second level filter targets on Russia and China’s specific 
involvements in the identified regions. The two independent variables aim to measure 1) bilateral 
interests’ maximization by cooperation or conflict and 2) global common perception toward a third 
party. In other words, these two variables are the two countries’ interest consideration in the 
bilateral and global context respectively. According to the two explanations discussed earlier, we 
have two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: the more bilateral interest that Russia and China can cooperate to maximize in 
identified regions, the lower level of conflict between Russia and China in the identified region 
should we expect to see. 
Hypothesis 2: the higher level of global common perception toward a third party that Russia and 
China share, the lower level of conflict should we expect to see. 
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As the regional explanation sees the new peaceful great power relationship as the result of 
Russian and Chinese security interdependence and their convergent understanding on many issues, 
identifying the types of their respective interests in particular regions is the key to demonstrate the 
plausibility of this explanation. Therefore, to measure whether their national interests have an 
impact to their relations at large, we need to demonstrate whether the patterns of their interests’ 
interactions correspond to a peaceful relationship. Accordingly, interests’ maximization by 
cooperation or conflict is coded by “cooperation” where it involves win-win economic 
development such as trade and other pure mutual interest behaviors, “strategic interaction” where 
it involves variable payoffs that differ from strategy to strategy such as investment in energy and 
infrastructure,92 and “conflict” where it involves zero-sum behaviors such as traditional power 
balancing and creating a sphere of influence.  
On the other hand, the systemic explanation believes that the Russia-China relationship is 
maintained mainly by external threat perception, which comes from two sources: the U.S. power 
existence and other non-traditional security problems that pose a trans-regional threat. Thus, we 
need to prove that both Russia and China care enough about the presence of the same third party 
in a global context. Measurement of common perception toward a third party focuses on the 
identification of common challenges they face, as well as the efforts they devote to counter these 
challenges. The following argument and coding rules are built on the assumption that accurate 
perception and calculation are possible. I am fully aware of the difficulties of establishing accuracy 
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in measuring perceptions. However, since a number of scholars have identified several factors that 
may contribute to the formation of perception (especially threat perception),93 there remain some 
standards and indicators that will shed light on patterns of perception under different circumstances.  
Generally speaking, threat perceptions are socially constructed within and among private and 
public conversations of experts, political leaders, and publics.94 Here I borrow three common 
indicators: the articulations of decision-makers (i.e. their expression of judgment), descriptions of 
contemporary spectators (foreign diplomats, colleagues etc.), and evidence of exploration by 
decision-makers on alternative responses to the threat (internal consultation or the search for 
external support).95 Thus, Russia and China’s common perception toward a third party is coded 
by “high”, where both countries’ diplomatic attitudes reflect concerns with highly overlapping  
issues, which also appear frequently in official discourse and third party spectators; “medium”, 
where countries’ official discourse brings up this concern and the literature discussion in the related 
subject can be found with some overlap in the content of issues but less match in opinions; “low”, 
where none or only a small amount of literature touches the topic in the discussion or they have 
little overlap in content.  
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For example, in Northeast Asia, both Russia and China want to maintain regional stability and 
prevent an escalation of tension or any external military intervention. Although their perceptions 
to danger converge in the short term, their interests vary in dimensions in the long term (which 
will be further discussed in the following section). Therefore, their common perception is labeled 
“medium”. Whereas if either Russia or China supports a more aggressive North Korea to unify the 
Korean Peninsula and presents threat perception toward the contaminating political ideology of 
South Korea (as in the case of the Cold War), they common perception would be “low”: one would 
concern a serious conflict and its consequences, while the other would worry about the domino 
effect of a rival ideology.  
At last, the dependent variable is the level of conflict between Russia and China. The level of 
conflict is coded by “high” where there are direct observable indicators of countries’ threat 
perception in the identified region, such as significant troop deployment or military exercises under 
threat perception; “medium” where there are open disputes over specific identifiable issues but no 
visible evidence that either side engages in any military mobilization; “medium-low” where there 
is no open dispute but some traces of potential dispute or divergent policy goals; “low” where there 
is no trace of any identifiable dispute or conflict in any form.  
The distinction between the code “medium” and “medium-low” may be tricky in this context, 
and an example may be helpful to illustrate where to draw the line. To take the RFE as an example, 
the level of conflict in the region is coded by “medium” because some government officials take 
sides in the dispute while the political message of Russian military exercises is blurry. This 
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ambiguity of the Russian side leaves many room for outside interpretations of the conflict between 
Russia and China. Whereas if the dispute remains in opinion pieces and the local government 
shows no sign of hostility toward China, or if a clearly identifiable political message is conveyed 
in the military exercises that China is not targeted as the hypothetical enemy, the level of conflict 
would be “medium-low” or even “low,” depending on the situation. 
Coding Rule Studies 
On Independent Variable #1: Bilateral Interest Maximization by Cooperation or Conflict 
In Central Asia, Russian and Chinese interest maximization should be characterized as 
strategic interaction. Their security interests coincide entirely, but their energy and economic 
interests are partly opposed. After the Cold War, Russia found it hard to maintain the security and 
regional stability in Central Asia against Islamic extremists, as Russia’s unstable domestic politics 
and diminishing economy could no longer provide incentives to Central Asian countries’ 
development. This is the reason that Moscow allowed the U.S. military presence in the region after 
9/11, and the establishment of the SCO was deemed as Russia’s acquiesce of China’s access into 
their traditional sphere of influence. Therefore, instead of continuing to maintain regional 
supremacy in Central Asia, Russia turned to an open alliance and a joint position with other 
external powers, namely China, in the issues of regional development and counter-terrorism. For 
example, one prominent strategic thinker in Russia claimed that the SCO is a “testimony to the 
Kremlin’s awareness of its own limitations, China’s ambitions, and the new states’ [of Central 
Asia] independence.”96 Another thinker argued that since the great power understandings that 
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allowed Russia to enjoy a hegemonic position had broken down, the Kremlin turned to co-opt 
China and the Central Asian states in constraining “outside” influence.97 For Russia, it cannot 
dominate regional development by itself, and maintaining regional stability and containing non-
traditional security threats would be harder without Chinese financing and cooperation.  
In terms of energy and economic interest, Russia seeks a leading role in the offshore Caspian 
oil and gas reserves. The creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Commonwealth 
of Independent States Free Trade Area (CISFTA), as well as the conception of a CIS Common 
Economic Space, are all Russian efforts to strengthen ties with local states and to achieve 
dominance by reinforcing their dependence through various soft power means.98 In the long run, 
these unilateral efforts are likely to limit Russia-China partnership in the region, and China’s 
attempts to gain access to Central Asian energy resources conflict with Russia’s goal of 
establishing monopolistic control over the region’s energy sector.99 Regarding the SCO, Russian 
leaders have expressed concerns over Chinese designs in the region, and they have been careful 
not to allow China to turn the SCO into its tool to increase China’s influence.100 Therefore, Russian 
and Chinese interest maximization in Central Asia should be labeled as strategic interaction, as 
they both compete for a larger share but none of them can achieve prosperity and stability without 
cooperating with each other. Therefore, they are motivated both to cooperate and to compete. 
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Differently, interest maximization in the RFE should be characterized as “cooperation”. Since 
the border was settled in the last century, Russia and China are presented with no visible security 
threat but the common interest in maintaining the regional stability. Their economic interests lie 
in a deepening economic relationship with cross-border trade and investment. In fact, the RFE 
needs China, which is one of the most important trade partners for Russia, and the Far East in 
particular. Moreover, China is also a necessary partner for RFE economic development, regional 
integration, and Russia’s Asia-Pacific policy extension. Despite discontent and tensions that 
appeared at the local level, the Chinese and Russian governments adopted an understanding, calm, 
and realistic attitude toward potential disputes.101 Both governments have manifested substantial 
efforts and a high degree of forbearance that aim to diffuse existing tensions. 102  Therefore, 
Moscow and Beijing are trying to develop a benign trade and economic relationship in the RFE, 
and a certain complementarity of economic structure of the RFE and Chinese Northeast will 
maximize their mutual interests with a deepening level of cooperation.  
In Northeast Asia, Russia and China have similar goals despite in different approaches 
sometimes. In the security realm, China and Russia are mutually concerned with the evolving 
political and military situation, and they both seek to maintain the status quo and the regional 
stability in Northeast Asia, especially on the peaceful resolution of the North Korea nuclear crisis 
and the maintenance of the nonproliferation regime.103 Additionally, none of them would like to 
see an escalation of tension, fearing that the spread of conflict and inflow of refugee would threaten 
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their own security.104 Complementary efforts include the two countries taking the same stance in 
involving North Korea in international cooperation regimes, rendering humanitarian aids, and 
urging Pyongyang to adopt economic and political reforms. In particular, for Russia, regaining 
diplomatic influence in any security initiatives concerning the Korean Peninsula would be a 
geostrategic opportunity for Russia to regain its great power influence and status.105 Therefore, as 
long as Russia and China still perceive the regional stability in the Korean Peninsula to be their 
highest interest, their major security interests would co-exist in cooperation.  
Furthermore, Russia and China’s economic interests in Northeast Asia do not conflict with, if 
not complement to, each other. The stability in Northeast Asia would be very conducive to the 
economic development of the Russian Far East, which is a key Russian presence in the Asia-
Pacific. Russia identified significant interest to exploit North Korea-Russian trade, and the 
potential for free trade led to the formation of the Rajin-Sonbong Special Economic Zone in North 
Korea. In particular, Russia’s economic interests in the region involve energy sales. With the 
growing energy shortage in the Asian market (including in China), Russia sees the Northeast Asian 
region as an energy export market that could back up its unreliable European market. This interest 
was reflected in the energy giant Gazprom’s proposal in December 2011 to provide $3 billion to 
finance construction of a 700-kilometer gas pipeline.106 Therefore, although in the long run Russia 
and China will potentially compete for greater economic integration and transportation networks 
in the Korean peninsula, their essential interests in security and energy will promote joint efforts 
in Northeast Asia. Therefore, Northeast Asia should be labeled as “cooperation”. 
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South Asia, especially India, arguably has great potential to influence the future of the Sino-
Russian partnership. Despite that Russia and China’s practical security interests and economic 
interests have little overlap in South Asia, they tend to converge in the global dimension. 
Specifically, since India has long been Russia’s customer in arm sales, Russia’s interests in India 
are consistent with its military-industrial complex. India has been Russia’s traditional ally during 
the Cold War, and even in the post-Cold War era Moscow’s ties with New Delhi remain much 
stronger than those between Beijing and New Delhi. On the other hand, China has long cultivated 
close ties with India’s rivalry Pakistan and remained on the agenda of limited cooperation with 
India. In particular, issues like unresolved border disputes and India’s growing security ties with 
the U.S. consistently impede China and India from becoming closer.107 Therefore, despite Russia 
and China’s different roles in South Asia, no respective bilateral issues with India are weighed 
sufficiently to affect Russia-China relations. Although some argued that Russia, with substantial 
defense collaboration and more advanced arm sales to India than to China, uses India as a 
surreptitious way to balance against China,108 no evidence suggests this argument’s consistency, 
validity, or direct potential for conflict.  
However, in the global dimension and in the context of the official doctrine of a multipolar 
world, Russia and China find their incentives to cooperate over issues regarding India. As the third 
power in Asia, India’s position is important in maintaining the multipolar order at least in Asia, 
and thus both Russia and China would not like to see India to be drawn closer to the U.S. pole. 
Although this triangular relationship remains a preliminary stage compared to the Russia-India or 
Russia-China relationship, the general tone has been harmonious and cooperative. Russia and 
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China’s interests in South Asia have been primarily strategic, since the two countries and India 
together face similar security environment and take similar positions on many international 
issues.109 Additionally, Moscow has been the proactive actor to bring the three countries together, 
as it repeatedly affirm the Asian triangle partnership proposed by Prime Minister Yevgeny 
Primakov in 1998 to bring India and China together.110 Therefore, Russia and China relations in 
South Asia should be characterized as cooperative. 
On Independent Variable #2: Global Common Perception toward a Third Party 
Russia and China have high common perception toward a third party in Central Asia. Above 
all, Russia and China both have very explicit and clear identification of threat that comes from 
“three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism.111 After the 9-11 attacks, Beijing was quick 
to recognize Uighur activists as terrorists, and the Chinese identified East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization. Similarly, Russia linked the Chechen conflict to the 
international terrorist movement.112 Since the fight against terrorism has been a driver for Russia’s 
policy and involvement in Central Asia, Russia has pushed for a more proactive role in the region, 
particularly after the terrorist attacks by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Kyrgyzstan 
(1999 and 2000) and Uzbekistan (2000).113  For instance, the Foreign Policy Concept of the 
Russian Federation in 2000 states that “we attach a priority importance to joint efforts toward 
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settling conflicts in CIS member states, and to the development of cooperation in the military-
political area and in the sphere of security, particularly in combating international terrorism and 
extremism.”114 In addition, Russia and China also identify other shared security issues. When 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin’ visited Central Asia in 1996, he stressed on promoting regional 
stability and countering drug trafficking and organized crime. 115  These threats were also 
addressed in Policy Concept of the Russian Federation in 2008, which claimed to “combat 
common challenges and threats, primarily international terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, 
transnational crime, and illegal migration.”116 
Although Russia and China acquiesced to the U.S. military presence in Central Asia, the long-
term consequences of the greatly expanded U.S. presence in the region worry both parties. On one 
hand, a number of Chinese literature advocated for this threat perception by evoking the heartland 
thesis of Sir Halford Mackinder to warn about the U.S. expansion in Central Asia.117 Additionally, 
Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of the general staff of PLA noted in March 2002 that China “pays 
close attention to how long the troops of the military will stay in that region.”118 On the other hand, 
Russia also had strong and negative perceptions toward the U.S. presence in the region. It 
concerned that U.S. force would stay after the operation and the U.S. would try to encircle Russia 
with its military bases. In particular, Gennady Seleznev, speaker of the State Duma, declared that 
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“Russia will not welcome the creation of permanent American military bases in Central Asia”.119 
Therefore, the common perception toward the third party in Central Asia is labeled “high”. 
In contrast to Central Asia, the Russian Far East is a case scenario that does not see any threat 
perception shared by Russia and China. Russia’s threat perception in the region mainly comes 
from Chinese demographic expansion and illegal immigration to the RFE. With all the evidences 
and opinions discussed earlier in the first section on the expectations of conflict between Russia 
and China, the potential tension in the RFE remains a bilateral issue, or even a local issue that 
originates from Russian domestic politics. Therefore, the common perception toward the third 
party in the RFE does not exist at all and is thus “low”. 
In Northeast Asia, Russia and China’s common perception can be traced, but is not as high 
and as convergent as in the case of Central Asia. In general, in addition to the clear Chinese wishes 
for regional stability that secures their investments, the Russians are also interested in seeing a 
stabilized Northeast Asia that leads to a prosperous RFE and simultaneously a counterbalance 
against the regional strategic dominance of the U.S.120 As a senior Russian official noted, “We 
have to think of preventive measures to defend our interests and…to defend our populations in 
territories contiguous to Korea in case of a serious conflict in that region.”121 Prompted by the fear 
that the U.S. would resort to force, Russia and China were brought together by the second Korean 
nuclear crisis. During the meeting between Putin and Jiang Zeming in Beijing in December 2012, 
both leaders expressed their concern over the Bush administration’s intention to deploy ABM 
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systems in East Asia.122 During another nuclear crisis in 2013, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov reiterated the concern by stating that “We are concerned that alongside the adequate, 
collective reaction of the UN Security Council, unilateral action is being taken around North Korea 
that is increasing military activity.”123 However, the Russians found out that the mutual concern 
about an American resort to force did not receive equivalent and unconditional Chinese support. 
Beyond the common concern for a U.S. intervention, China has a special interest in supporting the 
North regime as a buffer state, which was not shared by Russia.124 Therefore, Russia and China 
have a common perception toward the escalation of tension in the Korean peninsula and U.S. 
intervention; however, their perceptions diverge in the long term, and their common perception 
toward a third party should be labeled as “medium”. 
South Asia is concerned by both Russia and China as a regional great power on the continent, 
but their interests and perceptions tend to have little overlap in relation to the local states. The 
Chinese perception to India can hardly be identified as positive. While Sino-Indian relations have 
been gradually improved since the 2000s, India’s hegemonic ambition and its effort to contain 
China in cooperation with the U.S. stagger China’s improving perception toward India.125 In 
contrast, India has been Russia’s traditional ally in the region, and Moscow is able to maintain a 
cordial relationship with New Delhi throughout the time. Despite that Russia finds itself 
constrained by its economic and diplomatic resources to attract India, Putin has personally 
demonstrated his keen desire to reinvigorate the traditionally strong relationship between Moscow 
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and New Delhi.126 Therefore, although Russia and China share a common understanding to see 
India as a trade partner and recognize its role in supporting the multipolar geopolitical order and 
cooperating on security issues in Central and South Asia (mostly by containing Islamic extremists 
in Afghanistan or Pakistan), the discussion of a more meaningful triangular relationship remains 
at a grand strategic level with little literature centered on how Russia and China’s respective 
perception to India overlap and how they can have consequential effects on Russia-China relations. 
As most of their dealings with India remain separate and bilateral, it is hard to identify to what 
extent they agree or conflict on how they should jointly care about India. Therefore, their common 
perception toward a third party in South Asia is “low”.  
On Dependent Variable: Level of Conflict 
The identification for level of conflict between Russia and China across these four regions is 
easy with all the empirical evidences presented earlier in this paper. Under the third expectation of 
conflict in Central Asia, China’s deepening presence and increasing influence in the region is felt 
by Russia officials and is extensively discussed by opinion articles regarding the potential conflict 
over China’s expansion into Russian sphere of influence. However, as China would like to respect 
Russia’s authority at least in the foreseeable future and remain deferential to Russian policy goals 
in the region, there is no open dispute between the two governments. Therefore, we code the level 
of conflict in Central Asia as “medium-low”. 
In the Russian Far East, the dispute of an increasing Chinese demographic expansion as well 
as other relevant issues such as organized crime and illegal immigration is much more evident. 
While scholars and some regional political leaders constantly accuse China of these problems with 
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massive anti-Chinese propaganda, the governments of both sides also take measures to impose 
stricter regulation and to diffuse existing tensions. However, the Russian military exercises in the 
region in the recent years have complicated the situation. These exercises, called Vostok, are small 
in scale but are meant to display Russia’s ability to conduct combined arms operations. While on 
one hand, some external interpretations have seen these exercises as warning to China and Japan; 
on the other hand, there is no clear evidence that Russia has any specific threat perception or any 
warning information to convey through these moves. Therefore, we code the level of conflict in 
the Russian Far East as “medium”. 
In Northeast Asia, as previously discussed, Russia and China have converging interests in 
maintaining the regional stability in the short run, but their long-term interests and vision to the 
future of the Korean Peninsula do not really overlap. While China wants to maintain the status quo 
and continue its leading position vis-à-vis North Korea, Russia aims to exert more great power 
influence in the region and expects to benefit from the peaceful coexistence and a higher level of 
economic integration of the two Koreas.127 Since China regards the Korean Peninsula as its own 
sphere of influence and on North Korea regime as a protégé, Beijing may lack the willingness to 
accommodate Russian concerns when they are not identical to those of China. Therefore, due to 
Russia and China’s diverging policy goals in the long run and occasional concerns expressed in 
literature discussion, Northeast Asia should also be coded as “medium-low” for level of conflict. 
At last, scenario for conflict between Russia and China in South Asia is hardly discernable. 
Despite that Russia enjoys a stronger relationship with India than China does, their interests are 
not in conflict with each other, with perhaps the most disputable conflict being Russian arms sales 
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to India. Although Russia tends to sell more advanced weapons to India than to China, and India 
has become Moscow’s main foreign customer, the decline in Russian arm sales to China for years 
is mainly due to Beijing’s shifting to domestic manufacturing of advanced weaponry.128 Conflict 
over arm sales is in fact non-existent and there is no trace of any other identifiable conflict. 
Therefore, Russia and China’s level of conflict over South Asia, if there is any, is of little interest 
to opinion articles, and hence it should be identified as “low”. 
With the decreasing likelihood of conflict, the coding rule presented above can also be 
represented in a number scale from 1 to 3. Therefore, for the first variable, we have conflict (1), 
strategic interaction (2), and cooperation (3); for the second variable, we have low (1), medium 
(2), and high (3). For dependent variable, we have low (1), medium-low (2), medium (3), and high 
(4). See Table 2: 
Table 2: 
Region/Variable  IV1: 
Bilateral interest 
maximization by 
cooperation or conflict 
IV2: 
Global common 
perception toward a 
third party 
DV: 
Level of conflict 
Central Asia Strategic interaction (2) High (3) Medium-low (2) 
Russian Far East Cooperation (3) Low (1) Medium (3) 
Northeast Asia Cooperation (3) Medium (2) Medium-low (2) 
South Asia Cooperation (3) Low (1) Low (1) 
 
Since it is impossible to manipulate the development of Russia-China relations in these 
respective case scenarios in order to study their processes and consequences, comparative case 
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studies are introduced to explore the causation of IVs and their respective relations to DV. In 
particular, I use the strategy of looking at the cases that maximize variation across the DVs and 
IV. According to Table 2, we identify two pairs of comparative case studies: Central Asia vs. 
Northeast Asia, and Russian Far East vs. South Asia. These comparative case studies can shed 
light on our understanding of Russia-China relations in general because their variable 
configurations take on their extreme values. On one hand, in the first pair of cases Central Asia vs. 
Northeast Asia, these two regions have different and even opposite configuration on independent 
variables (IV1 and IV2), while the dependent variable (DV) remains identical. Therefore, we 
wonder if IV1 and IV2 play the same role in affecting DV, and if not, how we should explain their 
roles in the specific cases. On the other hand, in the second pair of cases Russian Far East vs. South 
Asia, we find the same configurations of IVs but quite opposite DV. Thus, it interests us to explore 
what may be the reason to this sharp contrast; how the result to these case studies will challenge, 
refine or sharpen our two hypotheses; and finally, what explanations can be provided to understand 
the peaceful Russia-China relations overall. 
 
Comparative Cases Studies 
Central Asia vs. Northeast Asia 
The patterns of power distribution in Central Asia and Northeast Asia indicate that both 
regions are part of an established sphere of influence, where the leading power is willing to 
cooperate with the other, but only to the extent that the former’s leading position is not challenged 
and its policy goals are not compromised. Central Asia is regarded as Russian sphere of influence 
while Northeast Asia is China’s. In either case, the leading power has been substantially involved 
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and invested before the other country steps into the region. On one hand, Russia has devoted to 
reestablish its leading role after it walked out of the chaotic and gloomy domestic situation 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, China continues to regard North 
Korea as an asset whose loss would result in negative shift in the strategic balance of the Korean 
Peninsula.129 With these policy goals in mind, however, both of them see the need to cooperate 
with each other for their common security interests against, above all, Islamic extremism and 
separatism in Central Asia and nuclear crises in Northeast Asia. Moreover, Russia and China are 
pushed further together under the concern that a large scale turbulence following a third party 
military intervention would completely disrupt the status quo and the regional power configuration, 
resulting in them losing their leading power position in the region.  
Furthermore, the type of interest to defend also plays a role in how countries react to potential 
conflicts. Generally speaking, security interests tend to be weighed more in conflict calculation 
than economic interests do. In this case, Russia’s dominant interest in Central Asia is primarily 
economic interests. Since Russia has virtually no spare export capacity with its domestic energy 
production, it attempts to use partnerships with energy-rich neighboring countries, namely 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, to ensure the reliable energy revenues from transit functions and 
to gain leverage over European gas markets.130 Because Russia’s economy depends heavily on oil 
and gas revenues (export of oil and gas accounts for about 60% of Russia’s federal budget revenues 
and two thirds of its exports), Russia’s economic growth thus can be significantly affected by the 
situation in Central Asia. Therefore, we see Moscow’s effort in supporting the activities of Russian 
state-owned energy company Gazprom, whose resource base holds natural gas from Central Asia 
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and Transcaucasia as a crucial element.131  On the other hand, China’s dominant interest in 
Northeast Asia is mainly political and security interests, with other economic interests only being 
complementary to consolidating the North Korea regime in order to fulfill the former two interests. 
This is not to say that China is preventing the two Koreas from reunification; instead, China assures 
other powers that it is very supportive toward reunification. What China truly concerns is that this 
unification would not take place in the form of war and the collapse of the North regime (which 
would threaten China’s own security), nor the assimilation of the North by the South (which would 
shift the power balance in the region towards the U.S.). Therefore, China positions itself as the 
indispensable force for facilitating talks and balancing powers, and its leading role exists primarily 
to defend its security interests.132  
Furthermore, security interests tend to have prior importance to economic interests, because 
activities involving security interests are more likely to be zero-sum games and economic interests 
can be offset or reimbursed in one way or another. In this case, although China increases its 
presence in Central Asia in forms of infrastructure development and energy resource investment, 
Russia has a higher level of tolerance toward Chinese economic expansion in its sphere of 
influence (to the level of “strategic interaction”) without generating more conflicts. The high level 
of common threat perception to terrorism and separatism in the region as a security concern further 
offsets Russian’s loss of economic interests, if there is any, due to Chinese presence; and this 
balance keeps their level of conflict to minimum (“medium-low” on the scale). On the other hand, 
in Northeast Asia, although Russia and China’s common threat perception is not as notably high 
as in the case of Central Asia, their convergence of security interest, at least in the short run, drives 
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them to take the same stance and to maintain their conflict of interest at a low level. In other words, 
although it appears that Russia and China’s interests conflict more in Central Asia than they do in 
Northeast Asia, economic expansion from one another is less threatening than a security threat 
perception, even if the threat comes from a third party. Thus, we conclude that when comparing 
the effect of overlapped interest and common perception on the two countries’ relations, all else 
being equal, the one IV pertaining to security issues tends to be enforced and weighted more in 
shaping countries’ relations. 
Russian Far East vs. South Asia 
In the case studies of the Russian Far East and South Asia, we observe the same patterns of 
IVs, but opposite DV. Strictly speaking, these two regions are not comparable because the RFE is 
domestic to Russia while South Asia is dominated by another major power, India. Therefore, in 
either case, Russia and China cannot interact to the extent that allows them to freely pursue their 
interests; in other words, their interaction are partly restrained by factors external to their foreign 
policy goals such as Russian domestic concerns and India’s interests and reaction. However, the 
comparison of these two cases still shed light on our understanding of Russia-China relations as 
how they interact with each other in a constrained environment and what factors, even if partially 
revealed, contribute to their patterns of interaction.  
In these two regions, Russia and China’s security interests are very limited. In South Asia, 
both their security interests and economic interests are barely related. In fact, most of these 
interests remain bilateral with the local power India and do not directly concern the other. Even if 
they have differences over certain issues (such as India-Pakistan conflict and Russian arm sales to 
India), these differences are overshadowed by their interest to cooperate in the global dimension 
to advocate for a multipolar world order. Thus, their interests in South Asia are not pushing them 
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towards conflict. Additionally, as previously showed, their common perceptions toward a third 
party in both the RFE and South Asia are very low. Therefore, both IV1 and IV2 in this case follow 
our hypotheses, so South Asia is not a valuable case in itself to be examined.  
However, the RFE is a peculiar case; it is domestic to Russia, and there is no visible security 
threat for either Russia or China since the border has been settled in the last century. Russia and 
China share security interest in simply maintaining the regional stability, or at least the 
unavailability to locate evidences about their other security interest indicates that this region is of 
low security concern to the both countries. In terms of Russia and China’s economic interests, the 
complementarity of the economic structure of the RFE and Chinese Northeast benefits both parties 
and makes their interactions cooperative in nature. With Russian design to use the RFE to extend 
its existence in the Asia-Pacific, Russia’s priority is to revitalize the RFE and to strengthen its 
economic links with Russia’s Asia-Pacific neighbors. While other than Chinese general policy 
goals in the realm of trade, investment, and energy resources, we can hardly identify any Chinese 
core national interest in particular to this domestic region of Russia. Therefore, the convergence 
of their interests (IV1) does not create scenario for high conflict in the region.  
As the level of conflict in the RFE (“medium”) is an anomaly to our hypothesis #1, which 
predicts that more cooperative interests would result in lower level of conflict, we look specifically 
at the RFE as a deviant case worth studying. This “medium” level of conflict is coded as the result 
of the large number of Russian dispute and threat perception discovered among local officials, 
local media, and opinion literature.133 Therefore, to understand the code (“medium”) assigned to 
the DV in this region, we need to trace back and examine the core evidence to this conflict. In 
retrospect, military exercises Vostok are arguably the symbolic moves targeting on other regional 
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powers, including China. Many western scholars have observed the exercise as a Russian 
preparation that allows it to counter Beijing’s potential threat and supremacy.134 However, the 
commander of Vostok 2010, Army-General Nikolai Makarov, stated that this exercise was not 
directed against any country or military bloc: “We did not look at any particular country and did 
not look at any particular enemy. We are talking about what direction we will create our own 
operational-strategic situation in the course of which somewhere a group of terrorists or large 
group of separatists are active.” Additionally, according to Russian Defense Minister, Anatoliy 
Serdyukov, the military exercise was designed particularly to test the deployment of forces and the 
operational command and control of the new brigade-based force structure. The key is to test the 
“new look” Russian armed forces and prepare for the scenario of anti-piracy, counter-terrorism, or 
the flight of refugee following the possible collapse of North Korea.135  In fact, the Russian 
government fails to articulate a clear political message and complicates the situation in the RFE. 
On one hand, Russia emphasizes its political objective and economic drive of regional integration 
with the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the desire to deepen security ties with its large neighbor 
China; while on the other hand, a counter-action strategy on the scale of Vostok-2010, given the 
force elements participating, themes pursued and operations rehearsed, points to China as the real 
source of Russian anxiety.136 Short of a diplomatic readjustment to end Russia’s international 
isolation in the Far East, Russia manifests vacillation and contradiction through its efforts seeking 
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economic integration with the Asia-Pacific region while simultaneously exercising deterrence 
against an unnamed hypothetical opponent. Therefore, this may explain the anomaly we observed 
in our model and result in the higher level of conflict in the region. 
Moreover, as a region that is remote to Moscow and has a history of conflictual and disputed 
border, the RFE has witnessed how central-regional (Moscow-RFE) relations and Russia-China 
relations shape each other. It is not surprising to find that the RFE has a different perspective on 
Russia-China relations than Moscow does. At the local level, these relations are driven by 
pragmatic and pedestrian issues (such as crime, labor force, or ethnic Chinese presence), rather 
than geopolitical or strategic considerations at the national level. Since 1995, a dominant tendency 
in the RFE has been the strengthening of local authoritarian regimes combined with the increase 
in xenophobia and anti-Chinese sentiments. Because perceptions, not reality, shape popular 
imagination, local leaders such as Governor Nazdratenko actively played the “Chinese card” in 
relations with the central government, resulting in large waves of anti-Chinese sentiment among 
the local population.137 Moreover, the local leaders accused Moscow of selling out to Beijing over 
the common border; by blaming all problems on Moscow and the Chinese, they evaded the 
responsibilities of corruption, misgovernment, and the economic backwardness of the region.138 
For example, Governor Nazdratenko took a vocal stand against border demarcation with China as 
he spoke in front of the Federation Council and initiated other public organizations against China. 
By successfully incorporating these anti-Chinese sentiments into his political toolbox, he rallied 
local support behind his authoritarian regime and comforted local Russians’ worries with his 
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“tough guy” image. 139  In short, the domestic political interest of local leaders that is not 
necessarily convergent to Moscow’s perspective gave rise to the escalation of conflict between 
Russia and China over the RFE. 
Most prominent Russian Sinologists, such as Viktor Larin or Yuri Galenovitch, believe that 
Moscow maintains little control over the regions of the RFE, and these military exercises are likely 
to be Russian maneuvers to strengthen its military control of the RFE.140 Although the impetus of 
military exercises is not yet clear as whether they are Moscow-oriented moves or the central 
government’s response to the RFE region, central-regional (Moscow-RFE) relations and 
bargaining leverages certainly play a role in the formation of disputes and the level of conflict in 
the RFE. Consequently, this regional factor disrupts normal Russian-Chinese interactions that best 
correspond to their foreign policy concepts and national interests. However, because the RFE is 
an exception to our case studies due to it being a Russian domestic region, its strategic limitation 
to the grand decision-making of Moscow corresponds to the containment of this medium level of 
conflict on a regional scale. Therefore, the Russian-Chinese level of conflict is still coherent to the 
model and the regional patterns established in Table 2 (Central Asia: “medium low”, Northeast 
Asia: “medium low”, and South Asia: “low”), and the maintenance of peaceful relations between 
the two countries is built upon the low level of conflict in these regions.  
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Conclusion 
Russia and China’s strategic partnership and their low level of conflict across their border 
regions would not be made possible without their convergence of interests, above all security 
interests in their neighboring regions. With the two-level filter and the model established in this 
paper, we identify four regions with strategic importance to Russia-China relations: Central Asia, 
the Russian Far East, Northeast Asia, and South Asia. Due to Russia and China’s respective 
interests and power projection capability, these four regions contribute the most to the overall 
Russia-China relations. The two pairs of comparative case studies provide us an insight to the 
independent variables that we identified from literature review. Bilateral interest maximization by 
cooperation or conflict and common perception toward a third party both contribute to the level of 
conflict between Russia and China across the regions and at large. We further conclude that 
security interests tend to be most valued by countries in comparison with economic interests, and 
common perception toward a third party serves to complement this interest calculus, in the way 
that threat perception can offset the loss of economic interest and maintain countries’ strategic 
convergence. Furthermore, although a domestic region can unilaterally create disputes or 
perceptions of conflict between two countries, strategic interest calculus (IV1) remains to be the 
key factor determining whether the tension is limited at the regional level or will advance to the 
national level. Even in a constrained environment in which a country’s central-regional relations 
may undermine the full implementation of its foreign policy concept at heart, strategic interest 
calculus still sits at the center of countries’ interactions and accounts for the low level of conflict 
between Russia and China.  
This understanding to the low level of conflict between Russia and China and their strategic 
convergence offers several policy implications. First, it has removed the danger of war between 
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Russia and China under their current political regimes at least in the foreseeable future. The 
regional stability in Asia should be clearly understood, and the security implications of Chinese 
increasing military capabilities, Chinese military modernization, and Russian military reform 
should not be exaggerated and overestimated. Second, the West, above all the U.S., should not 
have a too high threat perception to the Russia-China partnership. The West should not 
intentionally contain either of them and risk the danger of provoking the formation of a potential 
anti-West alliance. Third, to Russia and China, existing multilateral organizations such as the SCO 
should be better utilized to minimize their false perception toward each other, especially to reduce 
the disruption coming from domestic factors as in the case of the RFE. A clearer Russian political 
message and agenda should be delivered to China about issues such as the regional integration, 
economic development, and military operations targeting on non-traditional security threat and the 
maintenance of regional stability in the large area of the RFE and in Northeast Asia.  
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